Tim sent me his (always trenchant) comments.  Here they are:

• I was curious about how much population is contained in city spaces (14).  In light of this weekend’s games, a good strategy for the US is to focus on pacifying the cities (14 x 2= 28) and keeping the commitment low (you had 22 available troops), as it is hard for the insurgent player to counter.  I had trouble moving guerrillas into the cities and keeping them alive…
• A good counter to the above strategy is to kill off US troops.  I didn’t do a very good job of hunting them down (and you were good about not putting them in exposed positions).  I had hoped to run some bombardment operations but either my troops were in the wrong place or I had to do something else…
• Another possible counter is the one I stumbled upon in the last game: the VC wins the hearts and minds of the countryside and just enough of the cities to get the win.
• I was surprised at how the lack of resources really hampers the insurgent player.  I got a little frustrated during the first game because it seemed just when the NVA was ready to intervene, you would play an event card to either reduce or eliminate their resources.
• The ARVN and VC were much more active in this weekend’s games than in our earlier games, which were dominated by the US and the NVA.  The VC ability to subvert enemy troops makes them fun to play (you showed admirable forbearance in the face of my constant cries of ‘terror and subvert’….).  The ARVN troops gave me trouble in the second game and played a big role in holding the line until you could bring your airstrikes to bear.
• I missed a trick when I didn’t move the NVA troops into provinces that supported you.  I know you would have bombed them anyway, but the price would have been higher.
• Did you know that NVA troops can be used for terror operations?  I didn’t notice that until midway through the second game (there is a lot of nuance in this game).  I wonder if it would be a good idea for the NVA to send in small groups of troops for terror ops and maybe picking off the occasional enemy unit.
• Did you know that NVA guerrillas can set up in the south?  For some reason, I’d gotten it in my head that they couldn’t.
• I kept too many units back to defend bases.  I probably should have pushed more units forward into the fray…I think it wouldn’t be a bad idea to put more than one base in area so as to cut down on the numbers of defenders.

Tim came over the mountain last Saturday for a weekend of wargaming.   Spent Saturday afternoon/evening catching up and turned to on Sunday.  Many Private Reserves and Blue Boars were consumed.

Completed two (yes, two!) games of the two-player version of Fire in the Lake.  Finished up at 2310.  How?  We actually stayed on task (no football, especially if you count The Pro-Bowl), and the Coup Cards popped up sooner rather than later.  Coup Cards determine the end of a turn and also the an accounting for determining victory points.

There were three consistent threads in our talks during the games.  The first was how different the character of each game was, and the accompanying re-playability.  It’s a spendy game, but sure worth it.

The second was how tough it was to play.  Not the rules, how the card flow created the decisions that had to be made under less than ideal operational conditions.  There never seemed to be a direct path to accomplishing mission goals.  Who was that, Wolfe?  “War is an option of difficulties.”

The third focused on how each of the four sides had conflicting goals, and the impact on operations and results.  This is a great four player game.  The problem is finding four players.

US strategy emphasized pacification (with accompanying support), using air strikes and irregulars to attrit communists.  This was accomplished using a minimum of US troops.  ARVN troops would sweep to locate enemy guerrillas, so they could be bombed, with ARVN Rangers raiding provinces to destroy guerrillas.  In both games, the South Vietnamese were used to attain US victory points.

Both communist factions are hampered by a lack of resources.  As a result, their operations featured taxes, but also using terror to reduce support.  Infiltration was another favorite tactic since ARVN troops or police could be eliminated or “flipped”.

Both games followed the historical pattern of the US/ARVN forces controlling cities and VC controlling the countryside.  The first game was a US victory, the second was a tie between  the US and VC.

Great weekend of gaming with a great game.  Here’s photo of the end-game for game number 2.

Finally back from road trip.  Now I can post Tim’s observations about the game.  We have another session scheduled for Mid-December.

Here are my thoughts about Fire in the Lake-

Had a fun session with Tim this past weekend.  Full of fumbling and stumbling.

As discussed in an earlier post, this is a highly regarded game, with beautiful components.  And, as also discussed, for two old hex-and-counter Grognards, it promised to be a new experience, and not the type of card-driven game (Paths of Glory, Pursuit of Glory, Wilderness War, Wellington) we were used to playing.

This will be more an overview of the process, rather than a turn by turn narrative of the game we played.  I was so involved in figuring the damn thing out, that coherent recall much less thoughtful strategy was well beyond my capabilities.

First off, we really needed a picture of what the map board should look like when set up.  We messed up on where to put available cubes, what cubes to use as markers, and what counters go where.  It’s a new take on “idiot rules”, we need rules crafted for idiots.

The first difference we noticed between this and our previous card driven experiences was that each faction (USA, South Vietnam, Viet Cong, North Vietnam) cannot do something with each card.  Only two factions can play a card, and only one can play the card as an event.  Also, not only is the card in play turned up from the play deck, but also the next card to be played.  This forces players to anticipate how to react with two cards, not just one.

The deck itself is constructed differently.  In many games deck events and options are predicated on period of the conflict, or the play of a major event triggers the inclusion of more cards.  In FITL, the very large deck is initially split into six decks of twelve cards each.  A coup card is then shuffled into each deck.  Play commences with one deck, and after a Coup card is turned up and played, that Coup card is removed and the next deck placed under the remaining cards from the previously played deck.  There are a large number of cards that are not included in the six decks.  This must enhance replay.

Most card driven games involve reacting to an opponent’s play and  sequencing a group of cards held in hand.  This leads to a rapid sequence of play, with a card played quickly followed by another.  In FITL, the pace was less frantic, and steadier.  Maybe this was due to our inexperience.

The options for the first eligible faction (sequence of eligibility shown at the top of each card) are to pass (perhaps because of the next event) play the event, or play an operation (in multiple spaces), with or without a special activity. The second eligible player can pass, execute the event (if not done so by first player), or execute a limited operation.  Limited operations can take place in one space, only.  Only if the first two pass, can the third eligible faction act on a card.

We learned that Operations have complementary Special Operations, and successful play involved the ability to mix and match these operation types.  Also, the first eligible faction can really frustrate a stronger opponent by executing an Operation, only, after which the second eligible player can only execute a Limited Operation, not the Event.

All sides must be careful not to take too direct of an approach.  For the VC, taxing to raise resource levels or terrorizing the populace will alienate the local population, reducing support.  US airstrikes, while devastating militarily, are just as damaging to popular support.

While control of areas and provinces is the key to victory, each side has other activities,(not just destruction of enemy forces and many times in conflict with those of their “ally”) that contribute to victory.  For the VC and NVA, base building and maintaining the Ho Chi Minh trail must be a priority.  For the US, it’s ability to win is directly tied to reducing the number of troops being used.  ARVN forces gain victory points by siphoning off US aid into their coffers.

All of this maneuvering comes to a grinding halt when a Coup card is turned up.  The card in play is then considered to be a Monsoon card, which limits operational play options, and the Coup card is then the last card played.  After play for that card is finished,  victory points are calculated.  If a faction wins, it wins.  If not,  new aid and resources are distributed, and victory points are again calculated.  If one faction has attained victory, the other factions know it and the last deck is played.  An interesting way of changing play strategy and perspective.

Tim will be posting up his observations.

We’re playing this one again in December.